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IN MEMORIAM
HERBERT WECHSLER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW:

A BRIEF TRIBUTE
Harold Edgar*
The great English architect Christopher Wren is buried in his most
famous church, St. Paul's London. The inscription on his memorial
stone concludes with the words: Lector, si monumentum requiris, circumspice.
Reader, if you seek his monument, look around you.
That instruction serves well those who would appraise and honor
Herbert Wechsler's contributions to American criminal law. When he
joined the Columbia Law School faculty in 1933, this school did not teach
criminal law and much of the profession thought the topic was not worth
studying.' What fabulous good fortune it was that Herb thought otherwise. Throughout a long and productive career, in which he accomplished great projects with the highest distinction, he gave the greatest
part of his energy and talent to building a better criminal law.
Herbert Wechsler brought extraordinary talent to the work. He was
undoubtedly one of the greatest and most influential "lawyers' lawyers" in
2
the entire history of the United States. Herb knew an incredible amount
of law, and about law; he had superb skills at exposition and analysis; and
he possessed an unmatched ability to link the precise statement of a legal
problem with the broader set of legal and social values that might guide
its resolution. That latter gift was the kind that distinguishes the greatest
artists from the very good ones. His teaching and writing gained added
power by his unwavering intellectual honesty, and by always communicating his abiding conviction in the significance of law as an instrument for
improving individual and community life.
* Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science & Technology, Columbia Law School.
1. See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles in the Law":
Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 854, 868 (1993).
2. 1 believe that, the judiciary aside, no American lawyer has had comparable impact
on so many branches of law as Herb did through his foundational work in criminal law,
constitutional law, and the federal courts, and through his stewardship of important
American Law Institute projects. And that is just the scholar. The litigator won New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), among other important cases.
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The results of Herbert Wechsler's engagement with the criminal law
have been celebrated in this Law Review and others.3 It is no hyperbole
to claim that his work has produced the methodological premises and
analytic language that underlie much contemporary criminal law scholarship; the kinds of materials nearly all teachers use to introduce law students to the criminal law; and, not least to be sure, it provides the statutory framework and much of the content of the penal codes in more than

half these United States, as well as a significant influence on the development of particular criminal law doctrines in the rest of the states and the
federal courts, and indeed throughout the English-speaking world.
I.
The Model Penal Code is certainly the most famous, and I believe
the greatest of Herb's many accomplishments. But I want first to recall

his earlier criminal law work, because it is very important in its own right,
and it provides insight into the Model Penal Code and the origins of a
number of its provisions.
In 1937, the twenty-eight-year-old scholar published "A Rationale of
the Law of Homicide," co-authored with his senior colleague and close
friend Jerome Michael. 4 Rightly included in this Law Review's centennial
celebration of its greatest articles, 5 the "Rationale"'s first sentence observes the "insistent" demand for revision of the criminal law. In the ac3. In addition to the tributes in this issue, Wechsler's achievements are celebrated in
the Columbia Law Review issue dedicated to him at the time he became Harlan Fiske Stone
Professor Emeritus, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 947-1166 (1978). The "Resolution of the Faculty of
Law," written by Herb's immediate successor as Harlan Fiske Stone Professor, Benno C.
Schmidt, Jr., shows the extraordinary regard in which we, his colleagues, collectively held
him. Id. at 947-50.
The Symposium organized at Rutgers University School of Law to celebrate the
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 519-954 (1988),
contains important papers, discussions, and Herbert's response. See also, Sanford H.
Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 943, 945-51
(1999) (dedicated to Herbert Wechsler, and arguing that the Model Penal Code is the
field's most significant development in the past half-century). Sir Leon Radzinowicz's
Herbert Wechsler's Role in the Development of American Criminal Law and Penal Policy,
69 Va. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1983) captures some of his friend's personal qualities. Sir Leon's
death this past December is the loss of a second giant figure in the history of criminal law
scholarship, and one who, I am proud to say, regularly taught at Columbia Law School for
several years.
For important recent papers on the Model Penal Code, and its relationship to the
undone work of federal criminal law codification, see the Symposium issue in 2 Buff. Crim.
L. Rev. 1 (1998).
4. Herbert Wechsler & Jcrome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 1, 37
Colum. L. Rev. 701 (1937) [hereinafter, Law Of Homicide I]; Jerome Michael & Herbert
Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1261 (1937)
[hereinafter, Law Of Homicide II]. On their work together, see Herbert Wechsler, Jerome
Michael, 1890-1953, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 301 (1953).
5. See Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a
Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 54 (2000).
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companying textual footnote, the authors, speaking of the substantive
criminal law, note the oddity that "there has been no sustained effort
comparable to that which has been made abroad for generations, to
think through its inherent legislative problems and their relation to those
of administration and of treatment." 6 In the first page of his first important work, Herb had conceptualized what the field required in language
that fully anticipated the Model Penal Code and its Commentaries
twenty-five years later.
Herb attached great importance to legislation as the proper vehicle
for law reform, and especially, of course, for criminal law reform. Its centrality derived from the great battle against the view, current when he
arrived in law school, that law was a closed system whose principles could
be discerned by scientific analysis of precedents, rather than, as he and
other law reformers saw it, a means of governance in which essentially
political choices constantly are made and must be made, and therefore
should be made in conscious pursuit of sensible social policy.7 In a democratic polity, the place for ordering choices about what is sensible is the
legislature. This view of the matter is so much taken for granted today,
that it is hard to envisage what the battlefield looked like.
The "Rationale" did not propose model homicide statutes. 8 Instead
it presented a method for thinking systematically about the possible legal
responses to behavior that caused or risked death. Again, it takes a time
machine to recall that there were those who believed that new systems of
social and psychiatric science would displace the conventional analytic
categories of the criminal law, and that criminal reform must await elaborate empirical investigations. 9 Wechsler rejected the first view, and he
showed how much the reform effort could be advanced by examining
6. Law of Homicide I, supra note 4, at 701 n.I.
7. See Silber & Miller, supra note 1, at 857-64.
8. In the "Rationale," the authors did set out what they considered "the most
dehatable aspects of the legislative ordering of treatment factors in Anglo-American law."
See Law of Homicide II, supra note 4, at 1305 n.106. These were the felony murder rule,
the narrow consideration of the importance of motive, the narrow conception of
provocation, and the use in jurisdictions, such as New York, of the premeditation and
deliberation formula to distinguish the seriousness of murders. Id. The Model Penal
Code accepts three-fourths of the critique. It rejects premeditation, it broadens
provocation, and it rejects the application of the felony murder rule to truly accidental
homicides. See Model Penal Code §§ 2I0.1-210.4 (Official Draft 1980) [hereinafter
MPC].
Interestingly, the MPC did not carry forward the "Rationale"'s focus on motive, which
the "Rationale" proposed employing as an aggravating factor to replace felony murder,
and, where motive was proper, as a defense to some voluntary euthanasia. The MPC
maintains the prohibition on causing another's death with his consent, and extends the
prohibition even to the assistance of suicide. See id. § 210.5.
9. See, e.g., Sheldon Glueck, Crime and Justice (1936). For Wechsler's critical review
of Glueck's book, see Herbert Wechsler, Book Review, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 687, 689-92
(I937).
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with rigorous logic the social interests a branch of law sought to serve,
and how they might best be attained through law.

This method of inquiry underlies the Model Penal Code, although
the Code is presented without the "Rationale"'s exhaustive formulation of
logical possibilities. Much contemporary criminal law scbolarship continues in this channel: What precise interests is the law trying to protect,

and does current doctrine do it well? Such questions are focused by distinguishing among those who engage in behavior that threatens harm on
the basis of whether their conduct is purposive, knowing, reckless, or negligent with respect to the various aspects of the situation that make the
behavior properly of community concern. Stepping back and thinking
about the matter fresh, how might we better accomplish our ends?
The "Rationale" is filled with general insights about criminal law
problems that ultimately show up in the Model Code. It explores the
problematic role that causation plays in controlling decisions about the
treatment of offenders. 10 It notes the importance of criminalizing reckless behavior that does not cause harm in rationalizing the law of attempt.11 It suggests that intentional killings committed by a defendant
who negligently believes that circumstances exist that would, if true, justify his action, should be punished for negligent homicide. 12 These ideas
show up, respectively, in the Model Penal Code's grading of inchoate offenses at the same level as completed crimes, except for first degree felonies, where nullification is rightly to be feared;' 3 in the promulgation of a
general crime of reckless endangerment, the creation of which permits
the Code to retain the traditional rule that attempts require a purpose to
accomplish the object of the crime;1 4 and, most ingeniously, in the
Code's general view that the absence of a defense should be conceptualized as one of the material elements of an offense, thus permitting the
offense's culpability requirements to flow through to the defenses. 15

II.
Herb's second great contribution to criminal law was his and Jerome
Michael's revolutionary casebook, Criminal Law and its Administration,
published in 1940, which carried forward the "Rationale"'s method of inquiry, as well as its empbasis on legislation. Indeed, particular crimes
such as arson, burglary, and robbery were presented simply by showing
different statutes and, in footnotes, what courts had made of them. Much
more important, however, were the authors' ambitions to demonstrate
"the underlying problems to which legislation, adjudication, and adminis10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Law of Homicide II, supra note 4, at 1294-98.
Id. at 1298 n.82.
Law of Homicide I, supra note 4, at 726.
See MPC § 5.05 (1).
Id. § 211.2.
Id. §§ I.13(9)(c), 1.13(10).
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tration are all addressed," 16 and the extraordinary breadth of material
they used to do it. The book went beyond the usual appellate opinions to
include not only characteristic American statutes, but foreign statutes and
penal codes, reports of Criminal Law Revision Commissions, and testimony taken at Congressional Hearings, as well as countless excerpts from

books and law reviews. In addition, it included extensive materials bearing on the relationship between substantive laws and the administration
of law. I believe that Michael & Wechsler was the first American casebook
in any field to present materials treating explicitly the advantages and

disadvantages of deciding issues by rules, as against leaving them to judicial or administrative discretion, a tension that is now a standard focus of
law school teaching in many subjects. All the major criminal law
casebooks since share with Wechsler's an explicitly evaluative stance toward legal rules; and they draw from a much wider set of materials than is
common in legal instruction.

III.
Herbert's contributions to criminal law were not only scholarly ones.
Serving as a legal adviser, he played a major part in developing international legal norms and applying them at the Nuremberg prosecutions. in
particular, he was instrumental in the rejection of the plan to convict
individuals at second round trials simply by proving their membership in
a criminal organization. Although he did not believe that the Nuremberg proceedings were likely to generate a substantial body of criminal
law,1 7 I believe that the ever-increasing significance of international economic activities and the convergence in legal and political approaches
required to regulate them, as well as the communications revolution that
makes us immediate witnesses to large scale atrocities no matter where
they occur, suggest otherwise. But whatever the future may hold for international criminal law, 1 believe that Herb's engagement with the problem of applying criminal law norms at Nuremberg deepened his appreciation of the moral dimensions of criminal condemnation. The
categorical rejection of criminal conviction without moral fault is a core
organizing principle of the Model Penal Code, and it inspires some of its

16. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Criminal Law and its Administration, 1-2
(1940).
17. For Wechsler's account of his Nuremberg experience, see Silber & Miller, supra
note 1, at 891-917.

1352

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1347

most ingenious provisions.' 8 I do not find comparable emphasis on the
moral dimensions of the point in the earlier work.19

IV.
We come at last to the Model Code project itself. I say "project" to
emphasize the variety of tasks involved and the different roles Herb
played. He summoned the American Law Institute and the broader legal
community to the task with memorable language. 20 He drafted a large
part of the Code's general part, oversaw the whole, and played a key role

in the commentaries that accompanied the Tentative Drafts. These important documents served for a time as the only significant book-length
exposition of American criminal law. Once drafted, Herb explained the
provisions to the profession and public 2 1 and worked tirelessly to encourage penal-law codification projects throughout the United States. Finally, he oversaw the publication of the final commentary to the Code in
1980 and 1985.22 That commentary took into account many of the
changes that the Code had inspired, including legislative formulations
that differed from the MPC's. That there would be such variations was
understood and welcomed from the start. The ambition was a Model
Code, not a uniform one.
Herb always and everywhere insisted that the Model Penal Code was
a collaborative project, and that credit was owed to his collaborators, in
particular his co-reporters Louis Schwartz and Paul Tappan. In addition,
the Code's provisions were reviewed closely, and often modified, as a re18. For instance, MPC § 2.02(1) requires some level of culpability with respect to each
material element of an offense, except as provided in § 2.05. In turn § 2.05 permits
absolute liability with respect to violations, but violations are not punishable by
imprisonment, and conduct so labeled is not a crime. The clever part is the MPC's effort
to integrate this prohibition on absolute liability with the existing mass of penal provisions
in regulatory statutes, and to insist that any future legislation be explicit to countermand it.
Section 2.05 does this by reducing to a violation any non-Code offense where conviction is
based on absolute liability, and providing that to impose absolute liability in the future for
behavior punishable by imprisonment, the legislature must so state.
19. Herb was a utilitarian in his approach to criminal law, but he did not write any
extended philosophical account of his position. In Michael & Wechsler, supra note 16, at
4-20, the authors defended utilitarian approaches from the attacks of those who
deprecated deterrence as an end in law, and rejected, in passing, retributive justifications
for punishment.

20. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
1097, 1098 (1952). The article was drawn from memoranda prepared for the American
Law Institute, and in arguing the importance of penal law includes the oft-quoted lines:
"This is the law on which men place their ultimate reliance for protection against all the
deepest injuries that human conflict can inflict on individuals and institutions." Id.
21. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code,
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 465 (1961); Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the
United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1425 (1968).
22. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Part 2)
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code
and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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sult of consultation with an American Law Institute advisory committee,
and then the Council of the Institute-groups that included distinguished judges, academics, and lawyers of great distinction, with Learned
Hand serving in both committees. In addition, many younger scholars
participated in some facet of the work. From Columbia Law School
alone, the project drew on the talents of Frank Grad, Kent Greenawalt,
Ken Jones, Hal Korn, and the late Monrad Paulsen. 23 Still, Herbert
Wechsler indubitably was not only the project's architect but its engineer
and chief craftsman, too.
What can be said in relatively brief compass about so mammoth a
project? First and foremost, that it successfully achieved its goals to a degree beyond what anyone might reasonably have thought possible. In the
first half of the twentieth century, only one state, Louisiana, substantially
revised its Penal Code. What were the odds, ex ante, that the great majority of states could be provoked to do so by academics, even those whose
voice was modulated and amplified by the wisdom and prestige of the
American Law Institute? Professor Kadish's delightful account of prior
criminal-law codifiers, written in Herb's honor more than twenty years

ago, shows what became of prior efforts. 2 4 Thorough codification of the
criminal law comes up first and foremost against an ingrained professional disinclination to change the familiar, whether or not the familiar is

intellectually coherent-let alone well-conceived. Moreover, the disinclination to change finds intellectual refuge in the common law's celebration of courts' capacity to nuance wisdom. Thus, even Holmes, reviewing
skeptically a speech by James Fitzjames Stephen favoring codificationthough of civil law, not criminal-asserted, "The best draughtsman that
ever lived can feel a ground of decision more accurately than he can state
it." 25 Inevitably, thoroughgoing codification, even in criminal law, disables judicial creativity to some extent by binding judges to the Code's
mandates. 26 If it does not, it is not a code.
Great figures in the history of criminal law such as Livingston and
Fitzjames Stephen did not secure their codes' enactments, and Macaulay
did not live to see his adopted in India. To be sure, their work, like the
Model Code and its commentary, influenced legislation and legal
thought and development even when it did not trigger enactment. But
Wechsler's work and language did make the leap into positive law. Legal
solutions and language once integrated into law tend to stay for a long
time, protected from change by the same familiarity that makes the initial
23. In checking that there really was a Wren memorial at St. Paul's this summer, I saw
that placed next to it was a memorial asking us to recall those who made "Shapely the
stones of St. Paul's Cathedral."
24. See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Predecessors,
78 Colum. L. Rev. 1098 (1978).
25. O. W. Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 7 Am. L. Rev. 318-19.
26. See Kent Greenawalt, A Vice of its Virtues: The Perils of Precision in Criminal
Codification, As Illustrated by Retreat, GeneralJustification, and Dangerous Utterances, 19
Rutgers L. J. 929 (1988).
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passage so difficult, and commending themselves to other draftsmen because copying is the quickest and often safest way to get legal work done.

Accordingly, some of the Code's most significant innovations, for example, its definitions of kinds of culpability and its "substantial step" test for
determining whether preparation has become an attempt, as well as some

of its language that is pure Wechsler, such as the recognition that criminal sentences should not "depreciate" the seriousness of the offense, will

provide the language for legal argument for generations to come.
V.
1 want briefly to engage some of the substance of the Model Penal
Code, particularly because there are some who favor the American Law
Institute's undertaking its revision. From a technical standpoint, the

Code's great innovation is the detailed and comprehensive formulation
of the general part of the criminal law: definitions of action, voluntary
actions, elements and material elements of crime, the kinds of culpability,

and causation, as well as general rules covering justification and excuse,
the inchoate crimes, and the principles of complicity. When you consider the sheer number of complicated legal problems comprehended by

these topics and the limited statutory antecedents on which Wechsler
could draw, the degree of difficulty in the task he undertook is difficult to
overstate. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, whose drafters could
layer new legislation addressed to particular problems on top of a preexisting body of law whose continued application to problems not ad-

dressed by the text was stipulated,2 7 thus assuring a source of law from
wbich an answer to any problem might be drawn, a Model Penal Code
must repeal prior law and provide within its four corners such treatment
as may be necessary for courts to address whatever fundamental issues fall
within its domain.
The requirement of comprehensive coverage does not, of course, de-

termine the appropriate degree of detail. One can say "cause" and leave
the term undefined. One can use a term and rely on the courts to fill in
its background meaning by referring to the common-law formulae from
which it derives. The Model Penal Code takes a different tack and elaborates its position on fundamentals quite fully. In part, this engagement
with fundamentals flows from criminal law's legality principle and the variety of interests it serves. Nevertheless, I believe it also reflected Herb's
strong preference for legislative solutions. A commitment to democratic

governance entails a presumption against remitting to courts or other
administrators those policy issues that can have a general answer. Prior
law ignored that presumption to the extent it recognized the possibility of
a defense like duress, but left it to the courts to decide its content. To
Wechsler, that approach abdicated the legislature's responsibility to declare the content of the law. For example, the law that decides whether
27. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
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or not intentional homicides are criminal is the law of justification and

excuse. The situations in which it might be appropriate to permit one
person purposely to kill another are so few that one can make rules about
them. If you can make a rule-for example, should we require someone
to retreat if she knows she can safely do so before using deadly force in
defense-then, according to Wechsler, you should make it one way or the
other. For Holmes to say, as he famously did in Brown v. United States, that
"[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife,"28 begs the question. The result of this commitment to legis-

lation is that the Code addresses fundamental questions with vastly
greater detail than prior legislation.
At the same time, all recognize that there are many settings where no

legislative pronouncement is possible. People engage in behavior that
risks others' lives for so many reasons, and in so many ways, that all one
can do when homicide results is remit the question whether the death
was criminal to those who implement the law, courts or juries, to be decided pursuant to standards that weigh the actor's intentions and motives
for having created risks against community standards of lawful behavior.

Similarly, the Model Penal Code's sentencing and corrections provisions
assume that major decisions about the treatment of particular offenders
require individualized assessment at several different times. Thus, in the

sentencing and correctional context, the statutory "rule" empowers discretion and focuses in great detail on the kinds of decisions that judges
should make and which decisions are appropriate for parole administra-

tors. The rejection of the premises underlying the Code's approach to
sentencing is, of course, a large part of the story of American penal law

over the last twenty-five years, and I shall return to it. But because it engages the issues of who should be deciding what in such pervasive fashion, the Model Penal Code is, I believe, the great legislative achievement
of the "legal process" school of thought in American law.

The general provisions of the Code are sometimes faulted for want
of philosophical sophistication-for example, for saying more than can

be said about, or getting wrong, concepts like action and volition.2 9 I
believe this criticism does not fully engage the problem. The Code's general part serves four ends. First, and obviously most importantly, the rules

give content to the substantive provisions whose meaning would go begging without them. Second and closely related indeed, if not simply an
aspect of the first, the rules give uniformity and predictability to decisions

that implement the Code by instructing judges that an issue should be
submitted to the jury in these specified terms. (This makes the courts'
role less prominent, for example, in deciding what mental state applies to

particular material elements of crime, and this clarity in turn informs the
28. 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1920). Retreat is a "circumstance to be considered with all the
others." Id.
29. See George Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3
(1998).
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actions of prosecutors and defense attorneys.) Third, the rules help legislators and law reformers to think through new legislative problems by
providing a common language for their discussion, including provisions
that make it more likely that they will give legislation thoughtful consideration. 30 Finally, the general part provides some protection against careless future legislation by creating limiting principles of construction. 3 1 In
all of this, however, the concern is for the practical task of lawmaking, not
for abstract theory. Interestingly, Herb believed that the right way to in-

troduce students to criminal-law problems presented by such fundamental issues as involuntary action and mistake was by way of the problems

that animate the enterprise such as homicide, whose reach was limited by
such principles, rather than by considering concepts like knowledge or
negligence in the abstract.
I believe, therefore, that the proper focus for evaluating the Code is
whether and to what extent the answers its interrelated provisions give to
such questions as homicide or kidnapping fit contemporary circumstances and whether the language in which the Code would have factual
issues presented in particular cases as they are argued and decided can be
much improved. Is there behavior the MPC should reach but does not?
Are there many plausible cases that should be decided differently? I
think that most of the Code is built very well, as one would fully predict,

knowing Herbert Wechsler to have been its architect.
VI.
As noted, the principal domain where change in outlook has left the
Code's provisions not reasonably adaptable to contemporary legal thinking is in the field of sentencing. In the 1970s and '80s, the attack on the
Code's premises came from both the left and the right of the political
spectrum. The Left was concerned that rehabilitative pretensions and indeterminate sentences facilitated extended detention of persons who
would not pretend contrition; the Right, that these and other institutions
of sentencing that might alleviate the law's potential severity had under30. The MPC's culpability framework, § 2.02, makes it easy for lawmakers to think
through the prohibition of conduct element hy element, and decide that one kind of
culpability, such as purpose, may be required for one element, while negligence suffices
for another. I very much doubt whether the ongoing and rich debate over rape law, the
substantive area where the MPC's solutions seem most dated, could have been carried on
had the MPC not provided a framework of common language.
The MPC focuses future legislative activity in other areas too. For example, in
complicity, § 2.06(6)(b), it provides an actor with a defense to accomplice liability where
an "offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission." In such
settings, giving and receiving bribes, for example, the general rules require the legislator to
focus specifically on whether a special accomplice rule is desired.
31. In addition to MPC § 2.05, § 2.02(3)-(4)'s position that recklessness is the default
culpability, and that where one kind of culpahility is prescribed for an offense, it applies to
all elements unless contrary purpose plainly appears, serve both as drafting conventions
and as fail-safe rules when the legislature does not think of the matter.
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cut the criminal law's deterrent and incapacitive mission. With pressure

from both ends, the center did not hold, and rule-of-law values such as
amelioration of disparate sentences gained an urgency they might not
otherwise have had.3 2 As a result, the law increasingly rejected the need
for individualized assessments of an actor's character and its relation to
his behavior, either in deciding whether to imprison, or, if so, when the

offender should be released. Moreover, because "rehabilitation" could
not be accomplished in correctional settings-or so it was posited, based
on the failure to achieve consistent success in settings where measurement is extremely difficult 33-state power was morally corrupt if remis-

sion of sentence was bargained for signs of personal change of any kind.
Accordingly, everything relevant to determining the length of a sentence
was known at the outset.
These premises are entirely incompatible with the Model Penal

Code's approach to sentencing, but they also put pressure on the Code's
approach to defining specific offenses, as my colleague, Professor (and
now Judge) Gerard Lynch has shown. 34 The Code's approach to crime
definition assumed that the features of an actor's conduct that make it a
more or less heinous offense can be captured in a relatively few distinctions. For example, the Code distributes all felonies into only three clas-

ses. The full set of particulars about how the crime was committed, the
actor's motivation for committing it, the impact it had on its victim, and

the need to reassure a particular community that such behavior will not
be tolerated do not appear in a crime's definition. They can be determined, and taken account of, in administering a sentence. The Code's
premise, however, is that such considerations must be weighed in the sentencing process against other ends, including the implications for reform-

ative efforts if a prison sentence is imposed. They are not given automatic dispositional significance.

By contrast, the new sentencing systems created legal rules that discard traditional core values of the criminal law. Their sentencing codes

impose detailed dispositional consequences upon determination of factual matters that are not defined as material elements of crimes in a criminal statute, and are decided by judges pursuant to legal procedures that
displace juries and remove any duty to prove facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. The practical result has been to lengthen sentences even when
the individual judge thinks it unwise or when a jury might have refused to
32. Apart from problems of discretion, which are particularly acute in a federal system
if law enforcement can choose whether to proceed under state or federal law, disparity is
built into the substance of the criminal law and is not just a result of officials' inconsistent
actions. For substantial numbers of offenses, the law relies on local community standards
of what risks are justifiable ones to run and what inadvertence is egregious in deciding
whether behavior is criminal at all.
33. See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 Pub. Interest 22, 48-49 (1974).
34. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Penal Code, 7
Fed. Sentencing R. 111 (1994).
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convict were the sentence length and the facts on which it depends fully
understood. The question that got passed over too quickly is whether,
and to what extent, earlier legal reforms that were designed to ease the
harshness of sentences and that freed the sentencing process from strict
evidentiary rules, because almost everything was at least potentially relevant to sentence, 35 can be fairly conscripted to service in systems which
say that only a few facts are decisive, but we need neither enact them into
law as elements of crime nor prove them to a jury. The Supreme Court
decision last term in Apprendi v. New Jersey,36 rejecting on due process
grounds the use of a sentencing factor to extend the otherwise applicable

maximum sentence for a defined crime, shows that this important issue
will at last fully be part of the courts' ongoing dialogue about criminal
law.
Herbert Wechsler never accepted the wisdom of the new approaches
to sentencing. Indeed, he was confident that the pendulum would swing

back. 3 7 Perhaps that movement has begun already, with the new enthusiasm for drug courts. 3 8 Their premise is, after all, that the legal system can
shape individuals' immediate conduct and the likelihood of future lawabiding behavior by combining close monitoring with a combination of

threats and promises. That certainty sounds like an effort to reform individuals, while holding in abeyance the full rigor of the law. I believe that
the arguments against the rehabilitative ambitions of the criminal-justice

system were far too extreme, and yet their ripple effects have contributed
to the extraordinary growth of custodial incarceration in the United
States, with great states like California and Michigan spending more of
their budgets on prisons than education. Herbert Wechsler did not have
any illusions about reforming criminals. Indeed, his early work argued
for clearheadedness, as against those who thought reformation could dis-

place deterrence in the law's calculus. But he nonetheless deplored overreliance on prisons and his eloquence should provide the closing words:

Were it not for the accident of history that prisons emerged as a
humane substitute for death or transportation, which had previ-

ously been the normal fate of criminals, would the sense that
imprisonment is somehow the right penal sanction, rather than
the grave exception, ever have attained the influence it has? 39
35. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
36. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
37. See Herbert Wechsler, Revision and Codification of Penal Law in the United
States, 7 Dalhousie L.J. 219, 233 (1983).
38. According to a recent interview with former Assistant Attorney General Laurie
Robinson, there are now 350 drug courts in this country with 225 more in the planning
stage. "[W]e're seeing much lower recidivism rates among offenders going through drug
courts than similarly situated defendants who don't." American Bar Ass'n, 15 Crim. Justice
#2 at 16 (Summer 2000). See generally, Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831
(2000).
39. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, supra note 21, at
472.

